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April, 1953
JOINDER OF CRIMINAL CHARGES,
ELECTION, DUPLICITY
MAX D. MELVILLE
of the Denver Bar
This is one of a series of memoranda on criminal law and procedure pre-
pared under the direction of Bert M. Keating, District Attorney, Denver, Colo-
rado, for use by his staff and for distribution to other Colorado district attorneys.
This memorandum, which applies alike to indictments, informa-
tions and criminal complaints, discusses (1) joinder and mis-
joinder of charges, (2) election between counts and (3) dupli-
citous and nonduplicitous statements of more than one offense in
a single count. Counts are numbered as separate statements of
criminal charges in a single instrument. For example, Count 1 may
charge burglary, Count 2 larceny and Count 3 the receiving of
stolen personal property knowing it to be stolen.
Two or more criminal offenses may properly be charged in
one information if the joinder meets the tests hereafter discussed.
If joined, they must be stated in separate counts. '35 C. S. A., c.
48, §450.
A statute, '35 C. S. A., c. 48, §449, provides that, for example,
a charge of assault with intent to commit murder may be joined
with a charge of assault with a deadly weapon, instrument or
other thing with an intent to commit upon the person of another
a bodily injury [both of which crimes are defined in section 67
of chapter 48, '35 C. S. A.], provided those offenses arose from
the same transaction. And under either of those charged a de-
fendant may be found guilty of an assault without there being
any separate count charging that misdemeanor. The reason is
that an "assault" is an essential element in either offense and is
a lesser included offense, and the accused may be guilty of it even
though he did not have the specific intent to kill or do bodily
injury. See People v. Hopper, 69 Colo. 124, 126, 169 P. 152.
Assault and battery, however, is not an included offense in
assault to murder or assault to injure, and would have to be set
up in a separate count. Lane v. People, 102 Colo. 83, 77 P. 2d 121.
But it would be futile to make the charge since the penalty for it
and for simple assault are the same. '35 C. S. A., c. 48, §68, as
amended. Moreover, under the view expressed in the recent case
of Eckhardt v. People, 126, Colo .-......, 247 P. 2d 673, 677, a mis-
demeanor charge should not be joined with one for a felony,
which means that assault with intent to murder, a felony, should
not be joined with assault and battery, a misdemeanor.
A statute, '35 C. S. A., c. 48, §449, provides that charges of
(1) larceny, (2) embezzlement and (3) receiving stolen goods
may be joined. They must be stated in separate counts, '35 C. S. A.,
c. 48, §450, and, as will appear later, must arise from the same
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transaction or series of transactions. Ordinarily, there may be
a conviction on but one of the charges. Hill v. Best, 101 Colo. 243,
248, 248, 72 P. 2d 471; Sanders v. People, 109 Colo. 243, 244-245.
In other words, a person may not be convicted of both embezzle-
ment or larceny by bailee and larceny of the same property at
one time. Nor may he be convicted of any of those offenses and
also of criminally receiving the same property if it appears that
he personally stole or wrongfully converted to his own use, or
was personally present at such stealing or conversion. The excep-
tion to this rule would arise if he was an accessory before the
fact to the crime by counseling and advising it, '35 C. S. A., c. 48,
§13, and then knowingly received such property. In such case,
he probably could be convicted both as a principal in the theft or
conversion and as a receiver of the personal property. See Spinuzza
v. People, 99 Colo. 303, 306, 62 P. 2d 471.
Counts for burglary and larceny may be joined, Hill v. Best,
101 Colo. 243, 72 P. 2d 471, as may be counts for burglary and
for receiving stolen goods. Parker v. People, 13 Colo. 155, 160,
21 P. 1120. This decision discusses the notorious "Boss" Tweed
case, 60 N. Y. 559, which, the Colorado court said, "has called
for the severest criticism from our ablest criminal-law writers,
and is contrary to the weight of authority both in England and
in this country." There Tweed was charged in one indictment
with 220 law violations, charged in separate counts, and was con-
victed of 204. The court sentenced him separately on twelve con-
victions, the sentence on the first being for the maximum allow-
able. After he had served the first sentence, the New York Court
of Appeals freed him, holding that the sum of all of the punishments
could not exceed the maximum fixed for a single conviction. But
the court made the anomalous statement that had the 220 offenses
been charged in separate indictments, he could have been con-
victed on each and have been given the maximum sentence on each.
It is the practice when there has been a burglary coupled
with a larency, to charge in separate counts (1) burglary, (2)
larceny and (3) receiving stolen goods. While a person could
not be found guilty of all three of those crimes in a single trans-
action [unless he was both a receiver and an accessory before
the fact by counseling and advising], nonetheless he may be con-
victed of both the burglary and the larceny and receive separate
sentences to run one after the other. For example, if an accused
entered a home with intent to steal, he was guilty of burglary; and
if while so in the house he stole personal property, he committed
the crime of larceny. While there was but one transaction, yet
two separate crimes arose from it. Hill v. Best, 101 Colo. 243, 246,
74 P. 2d 471. Of course, if it was alleged in a single count that
defendant entered and stole, but one crime would be stated, Hill
v. Best, supra, which would be burglary. Collins v. People, 69 Colo.
343, 344, 193 P. 634.
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In all of these cases mentioned and to be mentioned, if several
persons participated in the offense, whether as principals or as
accessories before the fact, it is within the discretion of the dis-
trict attorney whether they shall be charged jointly in one in-
formation. Even when they are charged separately their cases
may be consolidated for trial if the judge thinks it advisable.
Quinn v. People, 32 Colo. 135, 75 P. 396. The same thing is true
where several informations are filed charging one or more per-
sons with offenses which lawfully may be joined in separate
counts. '35 C. S. A., c. 48, §450.
Section 450, chapter 48, '35 C. S. A. [the subdivisions of which
will be treated out of order for convenience and discussion] pro-
vides that where there are several charges against the same per-
son or persons for (1) one or more acts or transactions of the same
class of crimes or offenses which may be properly joined, or for
(2) the same act or transaction, or (3) two or more acts or trans-
actions connected together, such charges may be made in one
information, or if several informations have been filed they may
be consolidated for trial.
SAME CLASS OF CRIMES
Although the statute does not say so, it has been held that
the offenses, to be joinable, must either (1) arise from the same
transaction, or (2) be connected together. It is not enough that
the crimes are of the same class, or even the same crime in name.
Cummins v. People, 4 Colo. App. 71, 74, 34 P. 734; White v. Peo-
ple, 8 Colo. App. 289, 293, 45 P. 839.
For example, the crime of obtaining money by false pretenses
from A on one day cannot be joined with the crime of obtaining
money by false pretenses from B on another day, Cummins v.
People, 4 Colo. App. 71, 45 P. 734, or even on the same day if
the transactions are distinct. Hummel v. People, 98 Colo. 98, 52
P. 2d 669. It is only when the offenses arise from the same trans-
action, as where one robs two other persons at the same time,
that crimes, even of the same class, may be joined. See Wood v.
People, 60 Colo. 211, 212, 151 P. 941.
Again, for example, a number of larcenies from different
persons at different time cannot be joined, even though they were
committed on the same day. The reason is that the offenses arise
from different acts or transactions. Hummel v. People, 98 Colo. 98,
52 P. 2d 669.
The two examples above are where the offenses were against
different persons. But the principle applies equally where such
offenses are against the same person, if they did not arise from
the same transaction or are not connected together. Thus, where
there was an illegal joinder of offenses in an indictment which
charged defendant in Count 1 with the larceny of two head of
neat cattle from one Tolle on March 1, in Count 2 with larceny
of eight head of neat cattle from Tolle on May 20, and in Count 3
with larceny of eight head of neat cattle from Tolle on July 3,
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and where defendant was convicted on Counts 2 and 3, such con-
viction was reversed because of the misjoinder of those separate
transactions, although they were of the same class of crimes.
White v. People, 8 Colo. App. 289, 293, 45 P. 539.
SAME ACT OR TRANSACTION
Whenever separate crimes arise from the same act or trans-
action they always may be joined, provided they are of the same
class of crimes; for example, if both are felonies. Thus, in Eck-
hardt v. People, 126 Colo -...... ,247 P. 2d 673, 677, where a count for
voluntary manslaughter, a felony, was joined with one for assault
and battery, a misdemeanor, the supreme court expressed its dis-
approval, saying:
In the instant case, the two counts, of course relate
to the same transaction, but they do not relate to the
same class of crime. The fact that the court finally
charged on involuntary manslaughter, which is a misde-
meanor, does not alter or change the question presented
because the information as filed and as [it] remained
throughout the case, contained a first count of felony and
second count of misdemeanor. This does not present two
degrees of the same crime, but initiates a crime of a dif-
ferent class. So far as this state is concerned, this situ-
ation may require legislative correction. The practice of
joining a felony with a misdemeanor has, in some isolated
cases, undoubtedly followed, and technically speaking, we
cannot say that it is forbidden, or that such practice is
precluded by our present statute. However, when we con-
sider that under our statutes, in a case of homicide, as-
sault and battery is not one of the offenses as of an
inferior degree . . . we disapprove of the practice of
joinder as herein found.
As stated, separate crimes of the same class may be joined
if they arise from the same act or transaction; and this is true
whether the crimes be against the same person and different in
nature, or whether the same kind of crime be committed against
two or more persons.
Thus, as an example of the first situation, if in one transac-
tion A unlawfully enters B's home with intent to commit the
crime of larceny therein, and in fact does steal personalty in the
home, he is guilty of both burglary and larceny, and the charges
may be joined in the same information in two counts. Hill v. Best,
101 Colo. 243, 73 P. 2d 471.
And, as an example of the second situation, if A holds up B
and C at one time and place and robs each of personal property,
he is guilty of two separate robberies, which may be charged in
one information in separate counts, Wood v. People, 60 Colo. 211,
151 P. 941, and where a defendant is charged in separate informa-
tions with killing two persons at the same time and place, the in-
formations may be consolidated for trial. Harris v. People, 55 Colo.
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407, 135 P. 785. On the matter of different robberies stemming
from the same transaction, see In re Allison, 13 Colo. 525, 55 P. 820.
STATING TRANSACTION IN DIFFERENT WAYS
There are times when it is difficult to determine whether a
particular theft is larceny, larceny by bailee or embezzlement be-
cause of the problem of proving whether "possession" of the
property was obtained by defendant [1] wrongfully by trespass
or fraud [larceny], or [2] rightfully [larceny by bailee or em-
bezzlement], or, if rightfully, whether defendant's possession
came to him [a] under an express or implied contract of bailment
to deal with the property in a certain way [larceny by bailee-
Seebass v. People, 116 Colo. 555, 564, 182 P. 2d 901; Lewis v. Peo-
ple, 114 Colo. 411, 415, 166 P. 2d 150], or [b] by reason of his
office or employment [embezzlement-Sparr v. People, 122 Colo.
35, 38-39, 219 P. 2d 317]. Also, there is sometimes the possibility
that the evidence may show that defendant actually was not guilty
of the theft or the felonious conversion of the property, but re-
ceived it after the crime, knowing it to be stolen or feloniously
converted [receiving stolen goods].
In such situations it is permissible to charge the defendant
in separate counts in the same information with (1) larceny, (2)
larceny by bailee, (3) embezzlement and (4) receiving stolen
goods. '35 C. S. A., c. 48, §449; Smaldone v. People, 102 Colo. 500,
505, 81 P. 2d 384. Then if, as suggested above, there is a dispute
in the evidence as to the manner in which defendant came into
possession of the property, all of the counts are submitted to
the jury and they determine the disputed question, being in-
structed that they may find defendant guilty of but one offense.
Sanders v. People, 109 Colo. 243, 244-245, 125 P. 2d 154; Hill v.
Best, 101 Colo. 243, 248, 72 P. 2d 471, explaining Blackett v. Peo-
ple, 98 Colo. 7, 17, 52 P. 2d 389. The judge cannot compel the
prosecution to elect at the end of its case-in-chief upon which
of those charged offenses it will rely for conviction. If there is
insufficient evidence as to one or more of the counts, the judge
should direct a verdict of not guilty upon such count or counts;
but as long as the various charges relate to the same transaction
and a question of fact remains as to the offense which was com-
mitted, all counts must be submitted to the jury, and the prosecu-
tion cannot be compelled to elect. Kelly v. People, 17 Colo. 130,
133, 29 P. 805; Johnson v. People, 79 Colo. 439, 442, 246 P. 202;
Smaldone v. People, 102 Colo. 500, 505-506, 81 P. 2d 385. There
can, of course, be but one conviction arising from the theft or
receipt of the same money in the same transaction. Hill v. Best,
101 Colo. 243, 248-249, 72 P. 2d 471.
Whenever separate crimes of the same class arise from trans-
actions or acts that are "connected together," they may be joined
in separate counts in the same information. For example, where
a single statute made it a criminal offense (1) to manage or
assist in managing a house of prostitution or (2) to live on or be
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supported wholly or partially by the earnings of a prostitute, a
defendant was properly charged, in separate counts, with violating
both of those prohibitions of the statute. The court said:
The crimes charged are both for the violation of
the same section of the statute. They are for acts and
transactions of the same class of crimes and in this case,
as disclosed by the record, for acts and transactions con-
nected, done and performed at the same time and place;
the facts were intermingled; this brought them within
the provisions of this act. Trozzo v. People, 51 Colo. 323,
329, 117 P. 150. See also Harris v. People, 55 Colo. 407,
135 P. 785.
In Shaw v. People, 72 Colo. 142, 144, 209 P. 812, defendant
was charged in separate informations with (1) receiving stolen
goods and (2) with conspiring with John Doe to steal them. The
informations were consolidated for trial and defendant was con-
victed on both charges. The supreme court, in upholding the
conviction, said:
The consolidation was erroneous, it is said, because
the two offenses were not connected and did not grow
out of the same transaction and the proof of one would
have no tendency to prove the other. The prejudice al-
leged is that under this consolidation the jurors had their
attention directed to other similar offenses not otherwise
admissible. We think the position untenable. The trans-
actions were connected. Proof of one did tend to prove
the other. No prejudice resulted, because evidence of
other transactions to show scheme or intent would have
been admissible under either charge if tried separately.
In many of the cases thus far discussed, the charges
were made in separate indictments or informations and
were consolidated for trial, but they have been treated
as though they were made in separate counts in the same
information or indictment. The test of joinder is the
same in either case, since section 450, chapter 48, '35
C. S. A., says that joinable offenses may be joined in
one indictment in separate counts, and if two or more
indictments are found in such cases the court may order
them consolidated. Cummins v. People, 4 Colo. App. 71,
74, 34 P. 734.
Joinable crimes may be different offenses against differ-
ent persons, as long as they are connected together. For exam-
ple, A and B find C and Miss D sitting in an automobile. While
B intimidates C with a gun to prevent his interfering, A rapes
Miss D; and then B in turn rapes her while A holds the gun
on C. A, at gunpoint, forces C to remove his trousers and he
and B then drive away in C's car with the trousers. A and B
may be jointly charged in separate counts in the same informa-
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tion with (1) rape of Miss D and (2) robbery of 0. See State v.
Thompson, 139 Kan. 59, 29 P. 2d 1101, where it was said:
The reason for separate charges and separate trials
fails when the acts constituting the crimes are connected
together in a series in such a way that they amount to
one comprehensive transaction, and this is true whether
or not the offenses are of the same general nature. For
example, A breaks and enters a house in the night time
with intent to commit a crime, thus committing burglary.
He steals a $100 ring and other property, thus committing
grand larceny. He rapes the woman of the house, thus
committing rape. On being discovered by the man of the
house he kills him, thus committing murder. To conceal
his crime he maliciously sets fire to the home, thus com-
mitting arson. All of these acts form such a chain in
time, place and circumstances that they constitute one
combination event. The various crimes are separate, not
in relation to each other but only by definition in the
statutes, and there is no reason why they should not be
joined in separate counts in one information.
Granato v. People, 97 Colo. 303, 49 P. 2d 431, presents
an analogous situation where the court undoubtedly would have
permitted joinder of two charges against a defendant involving
the rape of two girls in immediately connected transactions. There,
A assisted B in removing one girl from an automobile so that
B could rape her (thus becoming an accessory before the fact,
and hence chargeable as a principal, in that crime) and then
raped another girl he had detained in the automobile.
Moreover, different crimes against the same person may be
joined in separate counts if they are connected together. Thus,
A may be charged in one count with the rape of Miss B and in
a second count with the crime of sodomy against her, if the two
transactions were connected. Sarno v. People, 74 Colo. 528, 530,
223 P. 41.
Frequently, so that some count will meet the evidence at the
trial, the district attorney will set up counts containing different
statements of the transaction. This is permissible. Bergdahl v.
People, 74 Colo. 528, 530, 223 P. 41. The question usually arising
is whether the counts relate to the same transaction. If the an-
swer does not appear on the face of the information, the district
attorney's statement to the court that but one transaction is in-
volved is sufficient, and the count may not require the district
attorney to elect before trial as to which count he will rely upon
for conviction. People v. Fitzgerald, 51 Colo. 175, 177, 117 P. 135.
This is because the counts in an information are presumed to
relate to the same transaction until the contrary appears. Short
v. People, 27 Colo. 175, 185, 60 P. 350. This rule applies to in-
formations consolidated for trial, even though each information
contains more than one count, since if the informations could
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properly be joined for trial, the charges in them could have been
stated in different counts in the same information. Bergdahl v.
People, 27 Colo. 302, 305, 61 P. 228.
Of course, if when the prosecution presents its evidence it
appears that in fact the counts do not relate to the same trans-
action, then, on motion of the defendant, the court will require
the prosecution to elect at that time the count upon which it will
rely for conviction.
WAIVER OF MISJOINDER
The fact of misjoinder of counts must be taken advantage of
by the defendant by motion at the earliest possible time or it is
completely waived. It cannot be raised later, even upon review
by the supreme court. If, for example, Count 1 charges A with
larceny from B on a named day, and Count 2 charges him with
larceny from B on another day, the fact of misjoinder is clear
on the face of the information, since the two offenses could not
possibly arise from the same transaction or connected transac-
tions. In such case the misjoinder issue must be raised before trial
or it is waived. Critchfield v. People, 91 Colo. 127, 131, 13 P. 2d 270.
And if the fact of misjoinder does not appear until the evi-
dence comes in at the trial-as where it then appears that the
counts do not, as the district attorney claimed, arise from the
same transaction-the defendant must move to require the prose-
cution to elect before the case goes to the jury, or the misjoinder
is waived. Sarno v. People, 74 Colo. 528, 223 P. 41; Warren v.
People, 121 Colo. 118, 122, 223 P. 2d 381.
There is no duty on the trial judge to compel, on his own
motion, an election. The defendant must make the motion, and
if he fails to do so a misjoinder of counts is waived for all pur-
poses. Quinn v. People, 32 Colo. 135, 138, 75 P. 396; Sarno v.
People, 74 Colo. 528, 530, 223 P. 41; Warren v. People, 121 Colo.
118, 121-122, 213 P. 2d 381. In Trask v. People, 35 Colo. 83, 88,
83 P. 1010, the supreme court overruled a contrary holding in
White v. People, 8 Colo. App. 289, 294, 300, 45 P. 539.
It has been stated, in Roberts v. People, 11 Colo. 213, 215-216,
17 P. 637, that it is within the sound discretion of the trial court
whether the prosecution must elect the count, as between or among
a number of counts, upon which it will rely for conviction. This
is both true and untrue, depending upon the particular facts
involved.
It is true where, despite the statement of the prosecutor to
the contrary, the counts relate to different transactions. When
the evidence develops that fact, the court will grant defendant's
motion to require an election.
It is also true where, as in statutory rape cases, there have
been several instances of the offense by defendant against the
same female. The information will charge a single offense as
occurring on a named day, but that date actually is immaterial.
The prosecution is not bound by its date allegation, but may prove
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any day within the statute of limitations, Laycock v. People, 66
Colo. 441, 444, 182 P. 880, and may prove that the offense was
committed a number of times. Eventually, however, the prosecu-
tion, on defendant's motion, must elect as to the specific act upon
which it will rely. The discretion of the trial judge in such cases
is as to when the election is to be made-whether before taking
of evidence begins, during the progress of the trial, or at the close
of the prosecution's case in chief. In any event, it must be before
the defendant proceeds with his defense. Laycock v. People, 66
Colo. 441, 444-445, 182 P. 880; Schreiner v. People, 95 Colo. 392,
395, 36 P. 2d 764; Shier v. People, 116 Colo. 353, 356-357, 181 P.
2d 366. See Schuete v. People, 33 Colo. 325, 80 P. 890. Where
but one offense is charged, but under the allegation it is possible
to prove others, a motion to elect before the evidence is in show-
ing them is premature. Warford v. People, 43 Colo. 107, 109,
96 P. 556.
This rule as to election by the prosecution applies, however.
only when there are two or more transactions. While it was stated
in Roberts v. People, 11 Colo. 213, 215-216, 17 P. 637, that, "A
motion to compel a prosecutor to elect upon which count in an
indictment he will proceed, when such indictment contains more
than one count, each charging a felony, is a matter addressed to
the discretion of the trial court," nonetheless, as was said in Kelly
v. People, 17 Colo. 130, 133-134, 29 P. 805, "The district attorney
was at liberty to proceed to trial upon both counts of the indict-
ment at the same time; and he could not properly be required to
elect upon which count he would rely so long as it appears from
the evidence that the two counts related to the same transaction.
In considering what was said in Roberts v. People, 11 Colo. 215,
about compelling the prosecution to elect, the distinctions between
different counts and different transactions must be kept in mind."
Accordingly, the rule is that "where the counts are properly
joined the people are not obliged to elect". Smaldone v. People,
102 Colo. 500, 505-506, 81 P. 2d 385. In some of these cases of
joinder there could be but one conviction, and in others there
could be a conviction on each count; but in neither event is an
election required.
If, as an example of where but one conviction could be had,
one count charges larceny and the second charges larceny by
bailee, defendant could not be found guilty of committing both
crimes in unlawfully converting the same property in a single
transaction. If the evidence fails to support one of the charges.
the court may direct a verdict of acquittal on that count. But
if a question of fact exists as to whether possession was wrong-
fully obtained [larceny] or rightfully obtained [larceny by bailee],
the jury must decide the fact issue. Therefore, both counts must
be submitted, with instructions that they may find the defendant
guilty of one or the other of the offenses, as they determine from
the evidence, but not of both. See Hill v. Best, 101 Colo. 243, 248,
DICTA
April, 1953
72 P. 2d 471, explaining Backett v. People, 98 Colo. 7, 17, 52 P.
2d 389.
If, as an example of where there can be conviction on more
than one count, the first count charges that A unlawfully entered
the house of B with intent to commit larceny therein, and the
second count alleges that A committed larceny in B's house, and
the transaction is the same, B may be convicted of burglary on
the first charge and larceny on the second. Obviously, there, the
court could not compel an election, since while there was but one
transaction, two distinct offenses were committed during it. Hill
v. Best, 101 Colo. 243, 72 P. 2d 471.
DUPLICITY
Duplicity is the joinder of two or more criminal offenses
in a single statement. It may occur in a single-count information
or within one or more of several counts.
The offenses may be (1) such as could be joined in separate
counts because arising from the same transaction or from con-
nected transactions, or (2) such as may not be joined because
relating to distinct, unconnected transactions.
For example, if the single statement is that A, intending to
commit larceny, unlawfully entered B's house and did so steal
personal property therein, the count is duplicitous because it
co-mingles two crimes in one statement. If A moves to quash
the information because of the duplicity, the district attorney
may allege the burglary and the larceny in separate counts be-
cause they arose from the same transaction. Hill v. Best, 101 Colo.
243, 247-248, 72 P. 2d 471. [If, however, A goes to trial on the
single allegation, there can be but one conviction-and that is
for burglary, Collins v. People, 69 Colo. 343, 344, 193 P. 634-
and he has been in jeopardy on both crimes. Hill v. Best, 101 Colo.
243, 246, 72 P. 2d 471.]
On the other hand, if the single charge is that A burglarized
B's house on May 1, and that on June 1 he stole B's automobile,
the information or count is also duplicitous because it charges
two crimes in a single statement; but in this instance the crimes
could not be joined in separate counts in the same information,
since they involve independent, unconnected offenses.
If an information charges in a single count that A, as bailee
of B, feloniously converted to his own use the personal property
in the bailment, namely, (1) certain household furniture, (2)
certain clothing, (3) a certain diamond ring and (4) a certain
sum of money, all the property of B, it is not, ON ITS FACE,
duplicitous, since the presumption is that there was but one bail-
ment of all the property and but a single conversion. In such
case, if the evidence at the trial shows four separate bailments
by B to A for different purposes, and shows the conversions were
at different times, the information in fact was duplicitous. Advan-
tage of that error may be taken by a motion to quash made at
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the trial because then was the first time such fact appeared. Trask
v. People, 35 Colo. 83, 83 P. 1010.
On the other hand, if it appeared from the evidence that
while there were different bailmenrts they nevertheless were for
the same purpose-as, say, for safekeeping-and that all of the
property was converted at one time, there was no duplicity. This
is because the crime lay in the felonious conversion, and as there
was but one, the offense was single. Lewis v. People, 114 Colo 411,
419, 166 P. 2d 150.
Similarly, where a count alleges that at one time and place
defendant stole the personal property of a number of persons,
the count is not duplicitous inasmuch as there was but one theft
and but one crime. Sweek v. People, 85 Colo. 479, 483-485, 277
P. 1.
A count charging a conspiracy to commit a number of crimes
is not duplicitous, since the gist of the offense is the unlawful
agreement and combination. Hamilton v. People, 24 Colo. 301,
303, 51 P. 425.
It was held in McLean v. People, 66 Colo. 486, 493, 180 P. 876,
that:
If, as is common in legislation, a statute makes it
punishable to do a particular thing specified, "or" an-
other thing, "or" another, one commits the offense who
commits any one of the things, or any two or more, or
all of them. And the indictment may charge him with
any one, or with any larger number, at the election of
the pleader; employing, if the allegation is of more than
one, the conjunction "and" where "or" occurs in the
statute.
For example, the forgery statute, '35 C. S. A., c. 48, §130,
declares it a crime (1) to forge an instrument or (2) to pass a
forged instrument knowingly. The prosecutor [if he wishes but
one conviction and penalty, or if he is unsure what the evidence
will develop] may always allege in a single count that defendant
"forged and passed" the instrument. The count is not duplicitous
and there can be put one penalty. Again, the forgery statute
makes it an offense either to "falsely make" or to "alter" an in-
strument with intent to defraud. While "altering" refers to a
previously genuine instrument and the charge is repugnant to
that of "falsely making" the same instrument, both may be charged
conjunctively in a single count.
No matter in which way the act is violated, the crime commit-
ted is forgery. Consequently, there can be no prejudice resulting
to the defendant in reciting in the information several ways the
crime may be committed. If defendant violated the statute in
only one way, the fact that the other ways were alleged is mere
surplusage and not prejudicial to his rights in any manner. Wright
v. People, 116 Colo. 306, 310, 181 P. 2d 447.
Accordingly, so long as the count states the various violations
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of the statute in the conjunctive there is no duplicity. Another
illustration is found in Johnson v. People, 79 Colo. 439, 441, 246
P. 202, where it was said:
The information was in a single count. It charged
that defendant did "own, operate and have in his pos-
session a still used, designed and intended for the manu-
facture of intoxicating liquor." Defendant moved to re-
quire the people to elect, because "he does not know of
which of these offenses he is charged." He must have
known. He was told by the information that he was
charged with all three. The charges were based on a sin-
gle transaction and he was found guilty of possessing and
operating. Had he owned one still, possessed another and
operated another, or owned at one time, possessed at
another, and operated at another, he would have been
guilty of three separate offenses. If at a single time and
place he owned, possessed and operated, or possessed and
operated, or owned and possessed, he was guilty of but
one. A motion to elect is addressed to the sound discre-
tion of the trial court. Roberts v. People, 11 Colo. 213,
215, 17 P. 637. Even where the charges are contained in
separate counts the motion will not be sustained if the
counts relate to the same transaction. Kelly v. People,
17 Colo. 130, 133, 29 P. 805. This motion was properly
overruled.
In People v. Fitzgerald, 51 Colo. 175, 176, 117 P. 135, it
was said:
The question for consideration is the ruling of the
trial court sustaining a motion to quash the information.
That pleading was drawn under, and based upon, Sec.
1685 Revised Statutes 1908, which, so far as pertinent
here, reads: "Any person who shall steal, take, em-
bezzle, carry or ride away any bicycle, or any person
who shall purchase or receive from any person, or con-
ceal or secrete, knowing the same to be stolen, taken,
embezzled, carried or ridden away, any bicycle, shall be
deemed guilty of larceny." The information, following
closely the language of the statute, in the charging part
states that "Simon Fitzgerald, . . . did feloniously
steal, take, embezzle, carry and ride away, and did felon-
iously then and there purchase and receive from some
person to the district attorney aforesaid unknown, and
did feloniously conceal and secrete the said bicycle, then
and there knowing the same to be stolen, taken, embez-
zled, carried and ridden away."
The motion to quash was based upon the proposition
that the information is "ambiguous, uncertain and du-
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plicitous" in that it fails to inform the defendant for
what particular crime he is being prosecuted and that
three distinct and inconsistent crimes against defendant
are charged in one and the same count of the informa-
tion. The court was clearly wrong in sustaining the mo-
tion to quash. The statute is in the disjunctive. The
stealing of a bicycle by a defendent, or the purchase or
receiving from any person, or the concealing or secreting
of a bicycle, knowing that the same has been stolen, all
are, and each is, under the statute deemed larceny. An
information conjunctively charging the same defendant
with doing all of these acts at the same time and as a
part of the same transaction is not duplicitous. Such is
the rule already established in this jurisdiction, and it
should have been heeded and applied by the district court
in this cause. We shall not repeat the argument to sup-
port it. We refer to, and again approve, McClure v.
People, 27 Colo. 358 [61 P. 12]. After reviewing and
discussing a number of cases bearing upon the point
now under consideration, this court, at page 367, thus
summarized its conclusion: "Where two or more acts,
stated in the statute disjunctively, either of which is an
offense by itself if done by different persons or at dif-
ferent times, when done by the same person and at the
same time and relate to the same transaction and are
followed by the same penalty, they may be united in one
count of an indictment or information, as constituting
but one offense. Though the fact does not appear upon
the face of the information, under the doctrine announced
in Short et al. v. People, 27 Colo. 175 [60 P. 350], the
mere statement of the district attorney that the differ-
ent acts relate to and constitute one and the same trans-
action is sufficient as against a motion to quash. This
information, in form, is like the one before the court in
McClure v. People, supra. Under the bicycle statute pre-
cisely the same penalty is imposed whether the defend-
ant stole the bicycle, or purchased it with the knowledge
that it had been stolen, or concealed or secreted it with
such knowledge. The ruling of the court is wrong. Trial
courts must be governed by the rule of pleading again
approved in this opinion. It follows that judgment on
motion to quash the information was wrong, and is there-
fore disapproved and reversed."
Other cases with the same ruling are Pettit v. People, 24 Colo.
517, 218, 52 P. 756; Rowe v. People, 26 Colo. 542, 544, 59 P. 57;
Howard v. People, 27 Colo. 296, 399, 61 P. 595; Kingsbury v. Peo-
ple, 44 Colo. 403, 404, 99 P. 601; Walt v. People, 46 Colo. 136, 141,
104 P. 89; Moffitt v. People, 59 Colo. 406, 412, 149 P. 104.
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TIME WHEN DUPLICITY MUST BE RAISED
A duplicitous count or information is not void but is merely
voidable; that is, it is valid unless and until the defendant, who
has that option, takes advantage of the defect by motion to quash.
Under Colorado practice, a motion to elect probably would not
be good until the defect appeared during the trial. Laycock v.
People, 66 Colo. 441, 182 P. 880. Where the fact of duplicity ap-
pears on the face of the information or count, a motion to quash,
or a demurrer, must be filed before the defendant finally pleads
to the charge. The rule against duplicity is for the defendant's
benefit, and he waives its advantage where it appears on the
face of the charge if he does not move in time. It is too late to
object after the trial has begun. Critchfield v. People, 91 Colo.
127, 131, 13 P. 2d 270.
However, duplicity may actually exist, yet that fact not be
apparent on the face of the pleading; that is, it may not appear
until the prosecution's evidence is in. The objection must be made
before the accused begins his defense, or it is waived. Sweek v.
People, 85 Colo. 479, 485, 277 P. 1.
A case where duplicity was not apparent on the face of the
information, but where it was held that a motion to quash should
have been sustained when the evidence disclosed the defect, is
Trask v. People, 35 Colo. 83, 83 P. 1010. There, the single count
charged Trask with larceny as bailee of certain household articles,
clothes, including a white dress and black hat, a diamond ring
and a named sum of money on a certain date. On its fact obvi-
ously, this charged a single conversion under a single bailment.
The evidence showed, however, that in fact there had been four
bailments, made at different times for different purposes. The
household articles and some of the clothing were entrusted to
Trask for safekeeping; the hat and dress were given to him to be
delivered to a third person; the diamond ring was turned over to
him to raise money for the use of the bailor, and the money was
given for safekeeping and to pay the expense of a trip planned
by the bailor. At the close of the prosecutions case-in-chief the
defendant moved to quash the information and for a directed
verdict of not guilty, but the trial judge refused. The supreme
court held that he should have done so and reversed the conviction.
On the other hand, in Lewis v. People, 114 Colo. 411, 415. 418,
166 P. 2d 150, the information charged that defendant became
the bailee of personal property for safekeeping and return to the
bailor. The evidence showed two distinct bailments, but also
showed they were both for safekeeping and that there was but
a single conversion. It as held that defendant's motion to quash,
made at the close of the prosecution's evidence, was properly over-
ruled because the offense lay in the criminal conversion and this
was single.
It is not the duty of the trial judge himself to protect the
DICTA
defendant against a duplicitous information; that duty is on the
defendant. Trask v. People, 35 Colo. 83, 88, 83 P. 1010, held overrul-
ing a contrary holding in White v. People, 8 Colo. App. 289, 294,
300, 45 P. 539, that it was the duty of the trial judge to correct a
misjoinder of counts. The rule is applicable alike to duplicity and
misjoinder. Trask v. People, 35 Colo. 83, 88, 83 P. 1010; Aarno
v. People, 74 Colo. 528, 520, 223 P. 41; Warren v. People, 121 Colo.
118, 121-122, 213 P. 2d 381.
This rule as to statement in a single count has no application
to situations where the sentence for a crime may be increased if
the defendant has been convicted previously of the same or other
offenses. Such former convictions must be set up in a count or
counts separate from that charging the present offense. They come
into play only if and when the accused is convicted of the sub-
stantive offense for which he is to be tried. Examples of such
situations are: (1) The habitual criminal statute, '35 C. S. A.
Supp., c. 48, §555(1) [L. '45, p. 310, §1], see People v. Wolff, 111
Colo. 46, 49-50, 137 P. 2d 693; (2) the joyriding statute, '35 C.
S. A., c. 16, §21, making a second conviction thereunder within
five years a felony, although the first offense is a misdemeanor;
and (3) section 187, chapter 16, '35 C. S. A. Supp. [L. '39, p. 229,
§4], increasing the penalty for one convicted a second time of
the offense of the driving of an automobile by an habitual user
of narcotic drugs or by one under the influence of intoxicating
liquor. See Heinze v. People, Colorado Bar Ass'n Advance Opin-
ions, February 21, 1953, page 167.
SUPREME COURT AMENDS RULE 115 (0)
(i) NUMBER OF COPIES TO BE FILED AND SERVED.
Ten copies of each motion, petition, brief, or other paper which is
typewritten, mimeographed or reproduced by some method other
other than printing, and fifteen copies of each thereof when printed
shall be filed; provided, however, that on motions for extension
of time or requesting oral argument, the original and one copy
only need be filed; and any instrument intended for the exclusive
use of the clerk, the original alone shall be deemed sufficient. Two
copies of each motion, petition, brief, or other paper shall be served
upon all parties except that in the case of typewritten motions,
briefs, or other papers one copy only need be served. Proof of
service shall be filed with the clerk. No such service shall be re-
quired upon a defendant in error who has not entered his appear-
ance in the supreme court as stated in the summons to hear errors,
but in lieu of such service one additional copy of each such paper
shall be filed. (From Supreme Court Rules 38 and 46.)




THOUGHT FOR THE MONTH
The following was expressed by Ray Murphy, General Coun-
sel for the Association of Casualty and Surety Companies in an
address delivered at the Institute on Personal Injury Litigation
presented by the Southwestern Legal Foundation, Dallas, Texas,
on November 14, 1952.
To summarize, I have attempted to indicate in this
discussion that there is a clearly apparent trend toward
extension of liability in tort cases. I have pointed to the
fact that the existence of actual fault on the part of the
defendant is, as a practical matter, no longer an indis-
pensable prerequisite to recovery, but rather its absence
is a mere impediment that can readily be met by flimsy
evidence of purely technical deviations from due care.
More and more, fault on the part of the plaintiff is being
disregarded. More and more, courts sanction judgments
based on doubtful and remote consequences of occur-
rences--occurrences which are not accidents in the usual
sense since there has been no contact; and more and more
courts are permitting recovery by or on behalf of infants
for injuries sustained before birth. Suits between mem-
bers of the same family are becoming more and more
common. I have noted that contemporaneously there is
a strong trend towards larger and larger jury awards,
with the rate of increase therein accelerating even more
rapidly than inflation and the cost of living.
All this may seem to paint a Utopian picture for the
plaintiff's lawyer. It may be only a mirage. One realistic
element is lacking in the phantasy-an inexhaustible and
ever present source of funds.. Since insurance companies
are not and cannot be such a source, and since no such
source exists, the trend towards higher and higher pay-
ments to more and more persons, in my opinion, can but
bring about the disintegration of our present system of
jurisprudence.
In the event of such disintegration, and if, as I be-
lieve, the then likely successor to the present system of
tort law would be a system based on compensation with-
out regard to fault-a system of purely administrative
law-we will find in such a substitute small comfort,
slight compensation and lean pickings for the negligence
lawyer. To the extent that he himself has contributed to
that result he will have contributed to his own profes-
sional demise.
"Every man owes some of his time to the upbuilding of the
profession to which he belongs."-Theodore Roosevelt.
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